Previous studies indicate that microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have different operational strategies to MFIs in South Asia (SA). Given the recent emphasis placed on the feasibility of MFIs to achieve the dual goals of outreach and sustainability concurrently, we examine and compare the relationship between sustainability and outreach of MFIs in LAC with MFIs in SA. Our results indicate that trade-offs exist between outreach and sustainability in both regions. However, the severity of trade-off is dependent on which goal MFIs decide to focus on in each region.
INTRODUCTION
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as a tool to help alleviate the prevailing poverty conditions and provide financial services to individuals and households who were excluded from the traditional financial system. According to a report by the World Bank, the microfinance movement has fundamentally altered the financial landscape in most developing countries while challenging the traditional financial system and government thinking. As a result, in Latin America and South Asia, microfinance provides most of the financial services to low-income individuals and households (World Bank, 2007) . In addition, the industry has contributed significantly towards the engagement of women and empowering them towards their social and economic well-being. In countries such as India and Bangladesh, the emergence of self-help groups (SHGs) has led to the promotion of female empowerment programmes and in a socially conservative country such as Afghanistan, women are accorded explicit recognition as economic agents as a result of microfinance interventions. Notwithstanding, the microfinance system is largely independent of the conventional financial sector and very recently, the sustainability of the industry has raised significant concerns.
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and South Asia (SA) are two regions in which the microfinance movement emerged around the same time (i.e., the 1970s) and have since become well-established in microfinance. However, the microfinance industry in both regions has developed some distinct characteristics. For instance, in SA, microfinance is typically rural rather than urban. Microfinance effectively started in SA at a time when poverty was extensively under scrutiny and thus it is not surprising that the industry is well rooted in the poverty discourse. However, in LAC, microfinance is more focused on designing financial products for microenterprises than on poverty. The industry in LAC also operated more like a business and thus was seen as a branch of the commercial banking system. This difference in operation can potentially be attributed to the economic conditions of both regions at the time microfinance began. Specifically, in the 1970s when microfinance began in Bangladesh, it was driven by a strong sense of idealism to address issues of poverty in rural areas which was widespread in the country as a result of the aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War. In contrast, as a result of the collapsing Bolivian populist regime, there was a widespread unemployment which led to the establishment of Banco Sol to help address issues of urban unemployment (Weiss & Montgomery, 2005) . Thus, microfinance emerged in LAC as a tool to provide credit to the informal sector in building successful microenterprises in urban areas. This led to the early embrace of the notion of profitability and commercialization in the region. With these initial ideological and economic differences surrounding the start of the industry in both regions, and by composition with LAC, microfinance in SA was more concerned about alleviating poverty than building successful microenterprises. In addition, microfinance in LAC focused on the poor rather than the poorest (Rutherford, 2003) . Today, the industry in both regions is still characterized by these major differences, with SA more inclined towards the alleviation of poverty while LAC is more oriented towards the promotion of microenterprises.
Evidence suggests that during the 1970s, apart from cooperatives, the average low-income household in SA had no access to financial services and if not for microfinance interventions, they would still be excluded from the financial system. Countries such as Bangladesh and India have observed astonishing high growth rates while other countries in the region had later starts with slower growth but have since been well-established as well. In the 1990s, microfinance in Bangladesh grew to include millions of clients and for the first time, a large proportion of low-income households had access to financial services. In India, based on the developed SHGs, the microfinance industry flourished substantially as well.
Although the microfinance movement in both LAC and SA has evolved significantly, the limits of the industry becomes evident when it comes to increasing outreach and remaining financially viable at the same time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the overall financial performance of MFIs in both regions is improving as the awareness of sustainability increases. However, there is a potential trade-off between sustainability and outreach. According to the World Bank, for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs) who are committed to the social goals of outreach perform better in terms of depth of outreach compared to MFIs that depend on subsidies (World Bank, 2007) . Thus, it is often argued that donor support and subsidies cannot sustain the microfinance industry (see, e.g., Helms (2006) ). Furthermore, with the growing emphasis on sustainability, anecdotal evidence suggests that focussing on sustainability adversely affects the social mission of MFIs, especially depth of outreach. This has led to significant debates however very few empirical studies exist on the issue.
Studies such as Hulme and Mosley (1996) , Conning (1999) , Zeller, Wollni, and Abu Shaban (2003) and Olivares-Polanco (2005) present arguments supporting the existence of a trade-off between outreach and sustainability. Evidence suggests that in an attempt to become sustainable, MFIs end up reaching out to the poor (i.e., relatively well-off clients) rather than the poorest. Navajas and et al. (2000) indicate that high transaction costs are catalysts to the trade-off between financial performance and outreach. Thus, given that smaller loans targeted to the poorest are expensive, MFIs rather prefer to issue larger loans which are usually targeted the poor in order to become and/or remain financially viable. Evidence presented by Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) suggests that microfinance service to the poor and sustainability can be achieved concurrently. However, there is evidence of a trade-off when the poorest are served. In contrast, other studies argue that sustainability and outreach depth are complementary objectives and thus there may not necessarily be a trade-off between these goals (see, e.g., Rhyne (1998 ), Woller (2007 and Mersland and Strøm (2010) ). Arguments presented in these studies suggest that as MFIs serve more clients, transaction costs are reduced and this helps in attaining sustainability since transaction costs are major determinants of financial performance. Relatively few studies provide evidence to support these arguments. For instance, Fernando (2004) , Hishigsuren (2007) and Makame (2008) use different samples but all came to the conclusion that there is no significant trade-off between sustainability and outreach.
Considering the emergence of the recent debates concerning the trade-off between microfinance sustainability and outreach, we set out to examine whether the trade-off phenomenon differs between LAC and SA and what region specific feature account for the differences, if any. As discussed earlier, the microfinance industry in these two regions has distinct characteristics and it is worthwhile to examine if the financial performance and outreach dynamics of these two regions vary as well. Thus, in this study, we examine if there is a trade-off between sustainability and outreach in LAC and SA using simultaneous equation models. We address the issue of simultaneity and endogeneity which has not been addressed fully in the existing literature. For instance, Cull, et al. (2007) did not adequately address the issues of endogeneity and simultaneity between sustainability and outreach. Quayes (2012) , on the other hand, attempt to address the issue of simultaneity but circumvented issues regarding endogeneity. Our study also examines the relationship between sustainability and outreach breadth, which has not received much attention in the existing literature. Furthermore, in order to address limitations in measuring sustainability and outreach, particularly, depth of outreach, we construct measurement indices. Most studies use average loan size as a measure of outreach depth with the assumption that poorer clients prefer smaller loan sizes. Thus, it is argued that as the MFI's average loan size decreases, it reflects the depth of outreach (i.e., more of the poorest are reached). Using this measure can be misleading in some cases, especially when there is a general improvement in the MFI's clientele and thus clients no longer require small loans. The use of measurement indices adequately addresses concerns regarding reliability of sustainability and outreach measures used in the existing literature as it combines the various indicators proposed as proxies for each variable, thereby capturing various dimensions that a single indicator fails to capture. Furthermore, we demonstrate empirically, if the profit status of MFIs in LAC and SA affect the outreach and financial performance of the industry.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variables used in this study as well as the details of the measurement index construction process. Section 3 gives an overview of the empirical strategy and model specifications. Section 4 presents the empirical results and lastly section 5 presents a brief discussion of the results as well as conclusions and some policy implications.
DATA & VARIABLES

Data
The data used for this study was collected from the MIX Market database (The MIX). The MIX provides data on several MFIs worldwide. This data is publicly available and contains information self-reported by MFIs to the MIX. Data from the MIX is often regarded as reliable because the MFI self-reported data is audited by the MIX before it becomes available publicly. Data from the MIX is widely used by microfinance researchers. For instance, Cull, et al. (2007) , Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) , Kai (2009), Marr and Awaworyi (2012) and Quayes (2012) all used data from the MIX. A major limitation associated with the use of data from the MIX is that data on some relevant variables are not available for certain time periods. The MIX relies on MFIs to provide them with information in order to compute relevant variables. Thus, where MFIs fail to provide such information, data from the MIX becomes limited for some relevant variables. As a result, we use an unbalanced panel dataset in our study. 
Variables
We consider two main variables -outreach and sustainability. Outreach in microfinance is categorized into two parts; depth of outreach and breadth of outreach (Schreiner, 2002) . With regards to breadth of outreach, given that the total number of borrowers an MFI has over time gives a good indication of that MFIs outreach, it is widely considered as an appropriate measure of outreach breadth. In contrast, depth of outreach is often associated with the 'quality' of a MFI's outreach. Thus, outreach depth concerns the measure of the poorest in society that MFIs have served. Measuring this variable appears to be quite complicated (Quayes, 2012) . In order to measure depth of outreach accurately, information on the poverty levels, assets and income levels of clients amongst other things needs to be obtained. Given the unavailability of such data for each MFI client, the commonly used measure of outreach depth in the existing literature is the MFI's average loan size. Microfinance researchers (see, e.g., Cull, et al. (2007) , Quayes (2012) ) have argued that there is a positive correlation between the income level of borrowers and the size of loans they require. Thus, it is expected that poorer clients would opt for smaller loans while the relatively richer clients would opt for larger loans. Others have also argued that the number of female borrowers is an appropriate proxy for outreach depth since the most vulnerable in society are usually women (Bhatt & Shui-Yan, 2001 ). Thus, MFIs that focus on women are improving their quality of outreach.
In this study, we construct a measurement index for both depth and breadth of outreach. We use average loan size and percentage of female borrowers as indicators for depth of outreach. For breadth of outreach, we use the total number of active borrowers and the MFI's number of offices as measures. Number of offices includes the number of branches as well as administrative sites and other staffed points (e.g., partner local shops), and is highly correlated with the number of borrowers. The emergence of branchless banking which includes the use of mobile banking could prevent MFIs from opening more branches but use technology to increase their breadth of outreach. However, given the level of illiteracy in certain rural areas, the use of technology for banking is likely to deter some borrowers. Thus, in the absence of offices outreach breath could be hindered. This suggests that MFIs with more branches have the advantage of attracting more clients since they make microfinance services more accessible to the poor, especially illiterates. In our regressions, we use these individual indicators as well as the constructed measurement indices.
In constructing the measurement indices, first, we rescale all indicators such that all the reported values range between zero and one. This is done after dealing with all potential outlier problems. Depending on which indicator is being rescaled, the rescaling process is done differently. For instance, the variables number of offices, the total number of active borrowers and percentage of female borrowers reflect high outreach only if the recorded values for these variables are increasing. On the other hand, for average loan size, which is expected to reflect the quality of outreach, as the reported values get smaller, it gives an indication of good outreach and vice versa. As a result, in dealing with the former set of variables, we assign the minimum value of zero to the smallest reported value for each variable and a maximum value of one to the largest reported value. All other reported values are rescaled to fall between zero and one. Equation 1 is used for the rescaling of these set of variables. For the latter, we do the opposite using equation 2. Thus, the smallest value is assigned one and the biggest value zero. We then take the arithmetic mean of the pair of indicators that fall under each outreach category.
Where ( ) is the computed re-scaled value, and represent the minimum and maximum values of the new scale respectively (in our case zero and one). and represent the minimum and maximum original values of the indicators reported in the sample respectively.
With regards to sustainability, indicators are chosen to reflect an MFI's ability to cover its operating costs using internally generated funds or revenue. Thus, indicators of sustainability are usually associated with measures of financial performance which can lead to the permanency of MFIs and their operations. With this understanding, in the existing literature, operational self-sufficiency (OSS), return on assets (ROA) and profit margin are often used as indicators of sustainability. We use each indicator individually as a measure of sustainability in our regressions and a sustainability measurement index constructed from all three indicators. The outreach index construction process explained above is used here as well and given that for all three sustainability indicators observed increases in values reflect good performance, we use equation 1 in the rescaling process.
Lastly, while the indicators included in each of our measurement indices are justified theoretically, we also perform a factor analysis to determine if these indices are valid empirically. From the factor analysis, we note that the highest variance between the indicators in our index is from the depth of outreach index analysis. Results indicate a variance of 0.25 for the percentage of female clients. Thus, for all the variables we include in each constructed index, a very low variance is not accounted for by the other variables, indicating that each variable in our measurement indices are relevant. In addition, the dimensionality of our factors is also well defined given that results indicate factor loadings higher than 85% in all cases.
EMPIRICAL METHODS AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
As discussed earlier, this study aims at examining the impact of sustainability on the outreach of MFIs and vice versa. A single equation model is fraught with problems of endogeneity and simultaneity bias in addressing this relationship. This is because of the potential reverse causality between sustainability and outreach. In the presence of simultaneity, estimates become inconsistent. Thus, to address the simultaneity and endogenous nature of the relationship between sustainability and outreach, we specify the following simultaneous equation models. Specifically, using the three-stage least square technique, we address the issue of simultaneity and endogeneity between sustainability and outreach.
Where is the measure of sustainability of a MFI and as indicated earlier, we use the developed measurement index as well as the three indicators involved in the index creation (i.e., profit margin, OSS and ROA).
is outreach and regression are conducted using measurements indices for both outreach breadth and outreach depth as well as the individual indicators used for these indices.
is the cost per borrower of a MFI. It is generally considered as an efficiency indicator in the microfinance literature and computed as the ratio of a MFI's operating expense to the total number of active borrowers. A high cost per borrower ratio suggests that MFIs are facing very high operational costs as such it is expected that sustainability would be impacted negatively should this ratio increase. Similarly, if loans become expensive as a result of high cost per borrower, MFIs may resort to the issuance of bigger loans, which in principle, suggests that depth of outreach is impacted negatively.
is the real gross portfolio yield and it is widely used as a measure of interest rates faced by clients of MFIs. We expect that yield would have a positive relationship with sustainability but not with outreach given that higher interest rates may deter some potential borrowers from borrowing. On the other hand, is the number of deposit accounts held by MFIs and can be considered as a proxy for the savings level of clients. Higher levels of savings accounts are often considered as leverage for financial institutions, even for economic development. As such, we expect a positive association between deposit accounts and both sustainability and outreach. is a dummy for MFI age. Data from the MIX groups MFIs into three categories of agenew, young and mature. Based on this classification, we introduce dummies for mature and new MFIs in our model, leaving out young as the omitted category. We expect that older MFIs would have the advantage over younger ones in terms of both sustainability and outreach.
is a dummy for the profit status of MFIs. We include a dummy for not-forprofit MFIs in order to capture the effects of MFI profit status on their sustainability and outreach performance. Based on conventional understanding, we expect that not-for-profit MFIs compared to for-profit MFIs would perform better in terms of outreach however when it comes to sustainability, we expect the reverse.
Lastly, and represent loan loss rate and gross loan portfolio respectively. An increase in gross loan portfolio is often associated with higher outreach, especially outreach breadth and since the financial performance of MFIs does not depend on the gross loan portfolio, we take advantage of this variable to identify equation 3. As the level of loan default increase, the general expectation is that financial performance would be affected negatively. Thus, we expect loan loss rate to have a negative association with sustainability. Furthermore, we also take advantage of the loan loss rate variable to identify equation 4.
Instruments
A valid instrument is expected to be uncorrelated with the dependent variable and error term but should be correlated with the endogenous variables. In our case, we require two set of IVs given that we are dealing with a simultaneous equation with two endogenous variables. First, for sustainability, our IVs are administrative expense ratio and operating expense ratio. These variables are known financial efficiency measures in the microfinance literature and are correlated with sustainability but not outreach. Given that we have two different measures of outreach, we use different sets of instruments for both depth of outreach and outreach breadth. Average outstanding loan balance and assets are used as instruments for depth of outreach while total number of loan officers and assets are used as instruments for breadth of outreach.
The assets of MFIs amongst other things include the number of offices that an MFI has and this has been identified to have a strong correlation with both dimensions of outreach. Nonetheless, it can be argued that assets may be correlated with ROA, which is a sustainability measure and thus it is not a valid instrument. We find a weak correlation between ROA and assets. ROA is a ratio which in itself involves a profitability measure, net operating income. This ratio is a complete transformation of an MFI's income and assets and thus this ratio has no correlation with the variable assets. With regards to loan officers as a valid instrument, we note that most MFIs depend on loan officers to bring in more clients and thus there is a correlation between loan officers and breadth of outreach, especially total number of borrowers. Similarly, average outstanding loan balance is correlated with average loan size and percentage of female borrowers making it an appropriate instrument for depth of outreach. Furthermore, these variables change overtime and this makes them appropriate IVs given that the data used in this study is a panel dataset.
With regards to our IVs for sustainability, it is often argued that the sustainability of MFIs largely depends on the level of transaction costs amongst other things Navajas and et al. (2000) . As such using measures that capture an MFI's transaction cost could serve as a valid instrument for sustainability. Operating expense ratio is an indicator that accounts for the costs incurred by MFIs which includes personnel expenses, transaction costs, administrative costs and other MFI operation related costs as a ratio of the MFI's assets. This ratio is expected to be correlated with sustainability but not outreach. One may argue that transaction costs are dependent on the numbers of clients that are served and thus there may be some correlation between outreach and operating expense ratio. Here as well, given that this is a ratio which involves other measures thus causing a transformation into an efficiency measure, we rely on this transformation and argue that the operating expense ratio is correlated with sustainability but not outreach. In addition, the operating expense ratio also includes administrative costs which are not affected by outreach. Thus, although transaction costs vary depending on the number of clients being served, administrative costs do not depend on this but also affect the sustainability of MFIs. This suggests that fixed administrative costs are not influenced by outreach and regardless of the whether clients are served or not, MFIs incur these costs. Thus, given that these administrative costs also affect the sustainability of MFIs Navajas and et al. (2000) , using administrative expense ratio as an instrument for sustainability is conceptually valid and satisfies all criteria.
We proceed with empirical tests to further support the theoretical arguments supporting the validity of our IVs. A common approach used to determine the validity of IVs is the overidentifying restriction test which works with the null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The Sargan test (Sargan, 1958) and the Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) have long been used for testing overidentifying restrictions. However, recently, various studies have proposed the use of the partial -squared (i.e., the r-squared from the first stage regressions) and the -statistics. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997) amongst others argue that when using large samples the validity of instruments may be compromised even when the there is a correlation between IVs and endogenous variables. As a result, the test for overidentifying restriction may not be reliable and cannot be conclusive in determining the validity of IVs. Hahn and Hausman (2002) and Hahn and Hausman (2003) argue that given the difficulty of getting valid instruments, most researchers resort to the use of weak instruments, however, existing tests for the validity of instruments are quick to reject instruments in such cases and this is a major drawback in empirical work. Bound, et al. (1995) recommend the use of the -squared from the first stage regression which includes the instruments while Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) propose that since the test presents statistics for the joint significance of IVs used in the first stage, the -statistics can be used and as a rule of thumb, for reliability of inferences, the -statistics from the first stage regression must be larger than 10. Furthermore, the use of first stage -statistics andsquared is a valid approach for instruments validity only in the case of a single endogenous regressor. Using this approach proposed by Bound, et al. (1995) and Stock, et al. (2002) , we conclude that the IVs used for both endogenous variables in our study are appropriate. We present the diagnostic test results in the next section, below each regression output table. Table 2 presents results for the relationship between the various measures of sustainability and depth of outreach for both LAC and SA. Panel 1 presents results for this association using the constructed measurement indices, panels 2 to 4 present results for the association between female clients (measure of outreach depth) and the three indicators of sustainability (i.e., ROA, profit margin and OSS respectively) and panels 5 to 7 present results for the association between log of average loan size (measure of outreach depth) and the three indicators of sustainability. Table 3 presents results for measures of sustainability and breadth of outreach for both regions. Panel 1 presents results for the association between our sustainability and outreach indices. Panels 2 to 4 present the results for the association between the log of total number of borrowers and the three indicators of sustainability while panels 5 to 7 present results for the relationship between log of number of offices and the three indicators of sustainability.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Sustainability and Depth of Outreach
From panel 1 in table 2, we observe that at the 1% significant level, for LAC, a percentage increase in depth of outreach leads to a 0.46% decline in the level of sustainability while a percentage increase in sustainability leads to a 1.81% decline in outreach depth. This suggests that there is a trade-off between sustainability and depth of outreach in Latin America. Similarly, we observe that for SA, a 1% increase in depth of outreach leads to a 0.68% decline in the level of sustainability while a 1% increase in sustainability is associated with a 1.35% decline in the level of outreach depth. Thus, results indicate a trade-off between sustainability and depth of outreach in both regions. However, we find that MFIs in LAC that focus on increasing performance in terms of outreach depth perform better with sustainability than MFIs that do same in SA. This is evident considering the stronger negative coefficients of outreach depth on sustainability for SA. In contrast, we find that for MFIs in LAC, the decline in outreach depth when MFIs focus on sustainability is greater than what is observed when MFIs in SA. Thus, while there is a trade-off between sustainability and depth of outreach in both regions, the severity of trade-off is dependent on which performance MFIs decide to focus on in each region.
Results from panel 2 of table 2 do not present evidence of a trade-off between ROA and number of female clients in the case of SA. We observe that for SA, if the percentage of female clients increases by 1%, there is a corresponding 0.08% increase in ROA. However, a 1% increase in ROA leads to a 10.56% increase in the percentage of female clients. On the contrary, evidence suggests that there is a trade-off between ROA and percentage of female clients in LAC. A similar association is observed in panel 3 as well, where results indicate that there is a trade-off between profit margin and percentage of female clients in LAC but not in SA. Considering panel 4 which explains the relationship between OSS and percentage of female clients, we observe that there is a trade-off between sustainability and depth of outreach in both region and the severity of the trade-off appears to be somewhat similar.
From panel 5 of table 2, we observe that in the case SA, there is no significant association between ROA and average loan size. However, for LAC, there is evidence of a trade-off. A 1% decrease in depth of outreach (i.e., increase in ALS) is associated with a 0.57% increase in ROA in LAC. Similarly, a 1% increase in financial performance (ROA) is associated with a 0.08% increase in average loan size (i.e., a decline in outreach depth). With regards to the relationship between profit margin and average loan size, results from panel 6 indicate that for both regions, an increase in ALS is associated with an increase in the profit margin of MFIs while increases in profit margin are associated with higher ALS. Thus, confirming a trade-off between sustainability (measured by profit margin) and depth of outreach (measured by ALS). Furthermore, we note that the effect of a unit increase in profit margin on ALS is stronger for MFIs in SA than those in LAC. Additionally, results indicate that a 1% increase ALS is associated with a 1.43% increase in profit margin in the case of LAC while for SA, a 1% increase in ALS is associated with a 1.7% increase in profit margin. Thus, we find that MFIs that give bigger loans in SA report higher profit margins than MFIs in LAC. Panel 7, which presents results for the relationship between OSS and ALS also suggest that there is a trade-off between sustainability and outreach. Here, we observe that a 1% increase in ALS is associated with a 0.52% and 0.33% increase in OSS in SA and LAC respectively. This suggests that giving out bigger loans is more rewarding in terms of OSS for MFIs in SA than MFIs in LAC. In addition, results indicate that depth of outreach is compromised more severely in LAC than in SA when MFIs attempt to improve their OSS. In essence, in an attempt to improve OSS, MFIs in LAC tend to give out larger loans compared to MFIs in SA. In fact, considering the size of the coefficients in both cases, ALS increases very significantly for LAC (2.48% compared to SA's 1.81%) with a percentage increase OSS.
Sustainability and Breadth of Outreach
With regards to the relationship between sustainability and breadth of outreach, our results from panel 1 of table 3 suggest that there is no significant relationship between sustainability and breadth of outreach in LAC. However, in SA for a 1% increase in sustainability, there is a corresponding 0.52% decline in breadth of outreach. The effects of our outreach breadth index on sustainability also present contrasting relationships for both regions. While there is no significant association between breadth of outreach and sustainability in SA, we find that in the case of LAC, a 1% increase in breadth of outreach leads to a 1.05% increase in sustainability.
Results from panels 2 to 7 to a large extent confirm these relationships described in panel 1. For instance we note that from panels 3, 4 and 6, there is no significant association between the measures of outreach breadth and the sustainability measures. However, there is a significant negative relationship between sustainability and outreach breadth. Specifically, from panel 3 and 6, the results for SA indicate that a 1% increase in MFI profit margin leads to a 0.24% and 0.28% decline in the number of borrowers and offices respectively. Similarly, from panel 4, a 1% increase in OSS leads to a 2.11% decrease in the total number of borrowers. Results from panels 2 and 5 however suggest that there is no significant association between ROA and total borrowers as well as total number of offices. Turning to LAC, unlike in the case of SA, results from all panels indicate that there is a positive association between all measures of breadth of outreach and all sustainability measures. We note that depending on what measure of outreach and sustainability is being used, the effects of outreach breadth on sustainability are positive in LAC and ranges from 0.03% to 0.22% for a 1% increase in outreach. On the other hand, based on results from panels 2, 3, 4 and 7, we find that ROA, profit margin and OSS have negative effects on total number of borrowers. OSS also has a negative effect on the total number of offices. Thus, as MFIs in LAC attempt to increase profitability in terms of their ROA, profit margin and OSS, it affects the number of borrowers reached negatively.
Overall, results indicate that there is no trade-off between sustainability and breadth of outreach in both LAC and SA. However, while focussing on the expansion of outreach breadth, MFIs in LAC have the advantage of performing better financially compared to MFIs in SA.
The effects of Other Regressors
Turning to the effects of the other regressors on both sustainability and outreach, we observe that from table 2, the relationship between LLR and all measures of sustainability is statistically insignificant in the case of SA except for its negative effect on OSS and ROA in panels 4 and 5 respectively. On the contrary, we find that for LAC, there is a significant negative relationship between LLR and all measures of sustainability except for a statistically insignificant relationship on profit margin observed in panel 3. This is consistent with the results from table 3. We find that for LAC, there is consistently a negative association between LLR and sustainability across all panels however for SA, a few panels present statistically insignificant results. This indicates that overall, for both regions, an increase in LLR has a negative effect on sustainability. Given that LLR captures the level of loss associated with loan default, a negative relationship is usual.
For the relationship between cost per borrower and our sustainability measures, we observe that from both tables 2 and 3, there is a negative association across all panels for MFIs in LAC. However, this relationship appears to be quite weak. For LAC, the largest coefficient is observed in table 2 panel 3, which predicts a 0.008% decline in profit margin for a unit increase in the cost per borrower. Cost per borrower gives an indication of how expensive loans are. It is calculated as the ratio of MFI operating expense to the total number of borrowers. Thus, a higher cost per borrower ratio suggests that loans are expensive and this can deter borrowers. As a result, when expensive loans drive clients away, it potentially affects their profitability and consequently sustainability. In the case of SA, cost per borrower is not always associated with profitability negatively as shown in tables 2 and 3. We find that in panels 2 and 3 of table 2, expensive loans improve the financial performance of MFIs. Panels 1, 4, 5 and 6 of table 2 however present a negative association between cost per borrower and our sustainability measures. This is consistent with results for SA from panels 1, 4 and 7 of table 3. As expected, we observe that for both regions, expensive loans are associated with lower levels of outreach depth. Specifically, we note that from panels 1 to 4 of table 2 for both regions, a unit increase in the cost per borrower is associated with a decline in our outreach depth index and also percentage of female clients. Similarly, from panels 5 to 7 of table 2 for both SA and LAC, expensive loans (determined by higher cost per borrower) are associated with an increase in ALS, which indicates a decline in outreach depth. Thus, given that bigger loans are associated with relatively rich clients, evidence suggests that in both SA and LAC, there is a re-orientation from the poorest clients to the poor when operating expenses increases. Furthermore, based on results from table 3 the evidence also suggests that in both regions, breadth of outreach is compromised when the cost per borrower increases.
With regards to the relationship between yield and both sustainability and outreach, we find that except for results in panel 2 of table 2 for SA, which indicate statistically insignificant relationships, all coefficients suggest a positive association between yield and all our sustainability and outreach measures. Likewise from table 3, except for a few statistically insignificant coefficients, evidence suggests that there is a positive association between yield and both sustainability and breadth of outreach. Yield is a measure of interest rate used in the microfinance literature and thus the observed positive association between yield and our sustainability measures is expected since it is often argued that high interest rates are associated with profitability (see Cull, et al. (2007) ). As a result, it is not surprising to find that in both SA and LAC increases in interest rates are associated with high profitability and sustainability. Surprisingly, from table 2 we find that an increase in yield leads to an increase in the percentage of female clients and a decrease in ALS, suggesting that increasing interest rates are associated with better performance in terms of outreach depth in both regions.
Deposit account serves as a proxy that captures the level of savings amongst microfinance clients and we expect that increase in the number of savings account would help MFIs expand outreach, especially outreach breadth. For LAC, from table 2, we find that there is mainly no significant association between deposit accounts and both sustainability and outreach depth, except for panels 1 and 7 where we find a weak association with our sustainability index and OSS. On the contrary from table 3, there is mainly a negative association between deposit account and our sustainability measures. In addition, results confirm that there is a positive relationship between deposit accounts and outreach breadth in both regions (panel 1). Considering deposit accounts and sustainability in SA, results indicate that there is mainly a weak positive association between deposit account and our sustainability measures. Thus, consistent with economic theory, an increase in deposit accounts (savings) gives MFIs in SA the leverage to perform well financially. Similarly, we observe that increases in deposit accounts are associated with lower ALS (better depth of outreach performance) but with poorer performance in terms of female clients served.
For the association between MFI age and our outreach measures, we find that based on results from panel 1 of both tables, there is no significant association between MFI age and both outreach measures in LAC. However, in SA, evidence suggests that new MFIs perform poorly compared to older MFIs in both depth and breadth of outreach. From panel 1 of table 2, we also find that older MFIs perform better than younger MFIs in terms of sustainability. However, from panels 2 and 3 of table 1, newer MFIs in LAC have the advantage of serving more female clients compared to older MFIs and also the advantage in terms of getting higher ROA and profits. In addition, results from panel 5 of table 2 indicate that older (mature) MFIs in LAC compared to younger and newer MFIs have the advantage of performing better in terms of outreach depth (i.e., giving out smaller loans). On the contrary, based on results from panel 4 of table 2, newer MFIs in SA compared to older MFIs perform poorly in terms of OSS and the number of female clients served.
For the relationship between profit status and performance, results from panel 1 of table 2 indicate that there is no significant association between profit status and sustainability in both regions, however in SA, not-for-profit MFIs perform better in terms of outreach depth. From table 2, results from panel 1 suggest that the profit status of MFIs have no effect on outreach breadth in both regions however we find that for-profit MFIs in both regions perform better in terms of sustainability. Results from panels 4, 5 and 6 of table 2 also confirm that not-forprofit MFIs compared to for-profit MFIs in SA have the advantage of performing better in terms of outreach depth. From these panels, we observe that if the dummy for not-for-profit MFIs switch from zero to one, there is either an increase in the percentage of female clients or a decline in the ALS, which in both cases indicate good outreach depth performance. In LAC, there is mainly no significant association between profit status and both outreach and sustainability across all panels except for panels 5 and 6 of table 2 which suggest that not-forprofit MFIs in LAC compared to for-profit MFIs have the tendency of giving larger loans.
Lastly, for loan portfolio, based on results from table 2 we find that there is no association between the size of MFI loan portfolio and our depth of outreach index as well as percentage of female borrowers in SA. However, from table 3, results indicate that there is a positive relationship between gross loan portfolio and all measures of outreach breadth in both SA and LAC. Thus, for both regions, as MFIs' gross loan portfolio increases, the breadth of outreach also increases. Considering depth of outreach, in the case of LAC, based on the results reported in panel 1 of table 2, we find that an increase in MFI loan portfolio is associated with a decline in outreach depth. Similarly, results from panel 2 suggest that there is a negative relationship between loan portfolio and percentage of female clients. For both regions, we observe from panels 5 and 6 that there is a positive association between loan portfolio and ALS. Thus, as the size of MFI loan portfolio increases, MFIs tend to give bigger loans hence higher ALS. Overall, results suggest that in both regions, higher loan portfolios for MFIs suggest the possibility of a mission drift. This is evident given that our results indicate a positive association between outreach breadth and gross loan portfolio but a negative association between depth of outreach and gross loan portfolio. More precisely, we note that with increasing trends in the gross loan portfolio of MFIs, MFIs tend to serve fewer female clients and give out bigger loans while their total clientele increases.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper has dealt with the issue of possible trade-off (or not) between financial sustainability and outreach performance by MFIs in two known major microfinance regions in the world, namely South Asia (SA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Even though microfinance emerged about the same time in both regions, the industry in each has presented differing characteristics over time. One of the most enduring and prominent dissimilarities is the fact that, due to the prevailing economic conditions in the regions, LAC adopted an early approach towards the notion of profitability when running microfinance institutions, while in SA, MFIs were primarily concerned with alleviating poverty and aiming at targeting the poorest households.
Our research findings indicate that trade-offs exist between depth of outreach and financial sustainability in both regions. Interestingly, our evidence seems to suggest that there are limits to the particular strategic focus that each geographical area has specialised in. That is to say, where the emphasis has been primarily on achieving financial sustainability (as in LAC), persistence in maintaining this focus leads to a greater loss in depth of outreach compared to SA, i.e. 1.81% vs. 1.35%. Similarly, a continuous emphasis on depth of outreach compromises financial sustainability to a greater extent in SA than in LAC, i.e. 0.68% vs. 0.46%. This suggests that a more balanced strategy is recommended in both regions whereby both depth of outreach and financial sustainability are pursued as long as they complement each other. To this end, further research is needed in order to answer key questions such as: where do these strategic limits lie? Is it possible to avoid over-stepping these limits? What policies need to be implemented so as to identify frontiers and ways to improve strategies?
Further evidence of trade-off demonstrates a connection to the particularities of each region. For instance, our findings show that MFIs in SA have to issue larger loan amounts than those in LAC for one unit increase in profit margin and one unit increase in OSS. This may be explained by the fact that, generally speaking, in SA disbursed loan amounts start at a much lower base than those in LAC, which relates to the particular focus on poverty alleviation in SA. For this reason, MFIs in SA need a much larger increase in loan amounts to achieve a 1% increase in profit margin or OSS.
However, in terms of outreach to female clients, our research findings provide mixed results. While there is no trade-off in SA between financial sustainability and reaching female clients, LAC extends less finance to women when focussing on financial sustainability. The reason for the latter finding might be because provision for female clients demands the extension of other services such as health protection and group formation, while these services are well established in SA, particularly in India, via self-help groups.
Lack of trade-off is also evident in the relationship between interest rates and depth of outreach, which might be explained by the common understanding that access to finance is more important than loan interest rates. Thus, clients that are desperate for credit are not deterred by high interest rates. Meanwhile, the correlation between profit status and outreach shows expected results wherein not-for-profit MFIs perform better in terms of depth of outreach and for-profit MFIs perform better in terms of financial sustainability.
In conclusion, our study has shown that trade-offs between the two major microfinance goals still exist in some important aspects and that these relate closely to the particular strategies that each of the regions has chosen to emphasise. Thus, it would be in the best interest of microfinance practitioners and policy makers to assess the benefits and costs of maintaining such strategies and those of adopting new mechanisms, which can lead to greater complementarity of objectives. 
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